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Hybrid Hegemonic Masculinity of the
EU before and after the Arab Spring:
A Gender Analysis of Euro-
Mediterranean Security Relations
ALI BILGIC
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
ABSTRACT In the academic literature on EU–southern Mediterranean relations, a focal
point of neglect has been the gendered dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This
article argues that the Euro-Mediterranean space has been formed within the gendered global
West/non-West relations with the purpose of promoting the West’s security interests. Euro-
Mediterranean security relations, thus, embody a gendered power hierarchy between the
hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the EU (bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) and the
subordinate (both feminized and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, it
shows that following the Arab Spring the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo
by reconstructing these gendered power relations. This gender analysis contributes to the
literature on Euro-Mediterranean relations through its specific focus on the (re)construction
processes of gendered identities within the West/non-West context in tandem with the EU’s
competing notions of security.
In the literature on relations between the European Union (EU) and southern
Mediterranean countries (Euro-Mediterranean relations), the issue of gender has
appeared sporadically as one of the several dimensions of the EU’s policy towards
its southern neighbourhood (Debusscher, 2012; Kausch & Youngs, 2009; Lister &
Carbone, 2006; Schmid, 2004). Several studies introduce the issue from the
perspective of the southern Mediterranean by evaluating the ostensible contributions
of feminist civil society in pursuing a more substantial democracy promotion agenda
in North Africa (for example, Ju¨nemann, 2002). Yet a gender perspective indicates a
more major and deeper gap. In the literature, apart from a few studies which argue in
favour of gendering security as a way of better realization of ‘human security’ or
‘soft security’ (Harders, 2003; Ju¨nemann, 2003), gender analysis of the security
relations, processes and structures in the Euro-Mediterranean area remains weak.
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Simply put, relevant studies have almost always neglected the fact that Euro-
Mediterranean security relations are gendered. This entails that power operates
through the construction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the purpose
of promoting certain security interests as an embodiment of global West/non-West
relations.
This article will problematize Euro-Mediterranean security relations by situating
it within global West/non-West relations and its gendered construction. It will be
argued that a hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space has been constructed through
feminizing and hypermasculinizing the southern Mediterranean in order to justify
the West’s intervention in the region and to promote EU security interests. This
leads to hyperfeminization of individuals and societies and to subordination of their
security concerns to those of the EU. Although the Arab Spring emerged as a process
in which individuals and societies resisted the mechanisms that hindered their
security, the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by preserving
gendered power relations. The first theoretical section of this article will discuss the
operationalizations of the theory of masculinities particularly within the context of
West/non-West relations. The purpose is to examine how different masculinities are
constructed in relation to different notions of security. This helps to explain the
hybridity of the Euro-Mediterranean space. Based on this theoretical foundation, the
second section will perform a feminist reading of the Euro-Mediterranean security
relations since its institutionalization in the 1995 Barcelona Process. Specifically, it
will analyse how power relations have been (re)constructed through gendered
identities with regard to EU notions of security. In the final section, the analysis will
direct its scope towards post-Arab Spring EU reactions and will examine the extent
to which the EU is reiterating the power hierarchy.
The gender analysis will pursue three objectives. First, it aims to contribute to the
growing literature on non-liberal security practices in liberal orders within the
context of West/non-West relations. Laffey and Nadarajah (2012: 404) argue that
this ‘has encompassed both liberal and non-liberal subjects and spaces, in Europe
and its imperial and colonial extensions, generating practices and apparatuses of rule
that are also hybrid in nature’. The present analysis explains this hybridity by
revealing the complexities of gendered identities constructed through/within Euro-
Mediterranean security relations. As Agathangelou (2013: 32) argues, global
structures and their reiteration largely depend on gendering individuals, social
groups, geographies and communities. Following this, it is argued that feminization
and hypermasculinization are essential tools for the construction of the Euro-
Mediterranean hybrid space. Second, this analysis aims to bring the gender
dimension into the growing critical literature about Euro-Mediterranean security
relations with a specific focus on the externalization process and its consequences.
Agathangelou (2004) discusses the issue of sex trafficking in the Euro-
Mediterranean area and the insecurities associated with it. This analysis will
broaden the gender perspective by including new issues such as democracy
promotion and counterterrorism in the new framework of hybridity of masculinities,
and by specifically focusing on how the EU constructs a Euro-Mediterranean space
by recourse to gender hierarchies. Finally, this discussion aims to evaluate whether,
2 A. Bilgic
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:2
7 0
3 J
un
e 2
01
5 
following the Arab Spring, there has been a change within the gendered spatial
construction of the Euro-Mediterranean.
Masculinities and Security: (Re)Production of Power Relations in the
West/non-West Context
Some feminists argue that in global politics, power does not solely operate through a
single dichotomy between masculinity and femininity. Understanding and
problematizing global power relations require a conception of gender that
transcends the dichotomy between single/universal dominant masculinity and
subordinated femininity (Zalewski, 1998, 2010: 37–40). Especially with the
emergence of Third World feminism which successfully examines western and non-
western masculinities in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Mohanty, 2006), many
feminists start to focus on ‘the politics of masculinity as a contested field of power
moves and resistances’ (Hooper, 1998: 29). In this contested field, different
masculinities interact; some of them hold dominating positions, while others are
marginalized. How power is institutionalized in and through gendered practices, and
for whom the gendered relations of domination work, can be grasped
comprehensively by extending the analytical scope to discuss masculinity as a
contingent, fluid, multidimensional and pluralistic phenomenon (Beasley, 2008: 87).
Therefore, understanding the relations between different masculinities has become
central for feminism, which aims to reveal the gendered dimension of power
relations and thus transform them (Tickner & Sjoberg, 2011: 227). The gendered
hierarchy of multiple masculinities has enabled feminist IR scholars to approach
masculinities along three lines: historicization of masculinities, hierarchy of
masculinities within the context of West/non-West relations, and contending
security notions in relation to different masculinities.
Firstly, IR feminists examine how masculinities have been historically
transformed and, therefore, evolved to survive by being constitutive to political,
social and economic conditions. For the purposes of this analysis, two models of
masculinity should be explained. ‘The citizen-warrior masculinity’ model carries
strong patriarchal elements (such as domination and control) combined with
aggressiveness and materialistic power use in order to secure what is considered as
the domestic. In ‘the bourgeois-rationalist model’, on the other hand, ‘superior
intellect and personal integrity is valued over physical strength or bravery’ (Hooper,
2001: 98; see also Hooper, 1998). By having an enlightened self-interest,
patriarchal domination of others is overlaid by guidance and persuasion. In this
sense, it is more egalitarian and democratic, and also less aggressive. Emanating
from the Enlightenment’s moral and political philosophy, the emergence and
gradual construction of the hegemony of the bourgeois-rational model points to
the contingency of masculinities (Hooper, 2001: 97). These masculinities can
occupy ‘the hegemonic position’ over other ‘subordinated’ masculinities (Connell,
2005: 71).
The contingency and historicity of masculinities leads some feminists in
International Relations (IR) to question the ontology of hegemonic masculinity: if
A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations 3
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masculinities are constantly in production (constitutive of subjectivities), is it
possible to ascertain any type of masculinity as hegemonic (Eichler, 2011)? It is
indeed the case that hegemonic and subordinated masculinities often take odd forms
in global politics depending on social, political and economic conditions, while
defying a monolithic and timeless analysis of masculinities (see Elder, 2005; Munn,
2008). However, as postcolonial feminists forcefully show, contingency of
masculinities does not necessarily mean that we can dismiss global political and
economic structures that produce gendered individuals, societies and states in the
context of West/non-West relations. This structural dimension sometimes manifests
itself as a ‘liberal international order’ which feminizes the non-West, and therefore
reproduces the hegemony of the West over non-western states, societies and
individuals (Ling, 2002). It is sometimes referred to as ‘neo-colonialism’, which
reproduces hierarchical power relations deriving from race, gender, sexuality and
class globally (Agathangelou & Ling, 2009: 2).
Secondly, as gender ‘is unavoidably involved with other social structures’
(Connell, 2005: 75), the analytical focus on the relational dimension of
masculinities has paved the way for studying the global constitution of gendered
identities and other identities including race, class and sex. In feminist IR
literature, these complex relations manifest as West/non-West, North/South,
citizen/non-citizen, heterosexual/homosexual, white/non-white, and capitalist/non-
capitalist (Han & Ling, 1998; Hooper, 2001; Kronsell, 2005; Ling, 2000; Ouzgane
& Coleman, 1998). Gender is instrumental to constructing these dichotomies where
‘the other’ is represented as subordinated to ‘the self’, which feminizes or
hypermasculinizes ‘the other’. For the purposes of this analysis, hierarchical
relations between masculinities in global politics are specifically taken in the
context of West/non-West relations. The power hierarchy between West and non-
West is constructed and reconstructed through hypermasculinizing and feminizing
the non-West, which is reproduced as ‘subordinate’ to the West. In the case of
hypermasculinization, the non-West is represented as authoritarian, barbaric,
violent, reactionary, irrational (or sometimes possessing ‘cold rationality’)
(Agathangelou & Ling, 2004). Feminization of the non-West, on the other hand,
constructs it as passive, emotional and weak (Han & Ling, 1998: 60–62). The non-
West, therefore, becomes ‘the other’ of the West (Doty, 1996; Spurr, 1993). This
self/other identity construction through the gendered representation of the non-
West is essential for the spatial construction of the non-West as an
underdeveloped, uncivilized, non-modern geography that requires the West’s
intervention and penetration to for its re-ordering (Slater, 2004: 223). Hence, the
non-West as a geographical space is produced and instrumentalized for the
political, economic and social reproduction of the West within the West/non-West
gendered power hierarchy.
Situating Euro-Mediterranean relations within the West/non-West gendered
power hierarchies, since the mid-1990s the EU’s policies at multiple levels have
spatially constructed a southern neighbourhood that constantly needs the EU’s
political guidance and financial tools as a hypermasculinized and feminized region.
This analysis will specifically look at how the southern neighbourhood of the EU as
4 A. Bilgic
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the non-West is instrumentalized through gendering for the security interests of the
EU. This leads us to the third point.
The third dimension of the analysis of multiple masculinities unpacks the
interaction of notions of security with the construction of hierarchical gendered
identities in West/non-West relations. Political identities that represent masculi-
nities are constructed, consolidated or transformed in relation to the security notions
of political actors. A masculine identity based on the citizen-warrior model is
constitutive to the (neo)realist notion of security feeding into statism, inside/outside
dichotomy and militarism. Aggressiveness in order to secure ‘the domestic’ and the
values inside the borders is accepted as a norm (Hooper, 2001: 103–105). The
bourgeois-rational model of masculinity, on the other hand, has a more democratic
and liberal approach to security. This type of masculinity manifests in liberal
transnationalism, as opposed to the Machiavellian world of (neo)realism (Hooper,
2001: 103–105). Hence its security notion revolves around a liberal-pluralist
approach. Democratization and promotion of human rights (and the establishment of
a free-market economy as a means to achieve this) are crucial components of the
pursuit of security not only domestically but also internationally. Therefore, political
actors adopting this masculinity aim to secure themselves by promoting liberal
values outside their borders and by being a model for others (see Tickner, 1992).
How does the security notions/masculinities nexus work in the context of West/non-
West relations?
Notions of security (meaning ideas and practices about what is to be secured and
how it is to be secured) are constitutive to the construction processes of hegemonic
western and subordinate non-western masculine identities. The spatial construction
of the non-West through feminizing and hypermasculinizing is practised with the
trajectory of promoting the West’s security interests. This means that
representations of the non-West are constitutive to the notions of security in the
West. Hypermasculine representations of the non-West as an excessively violent,
barbaric, irrational space produce security notions that prioritize domination and
militarization as responses to the violent other. Feminization of the non-West is also
a threat to the West’s security because of its incapacity to perform or failure to keep
up with the modern, democratic, ‘western’ state. For example, this ‘failure’ provided
a fertile ground for communism to take root during the cold war (Slater, 2004: 124).
In contemporary global politics, non-western states are sometimes represented as a
source of fundamentalist terrorism (Biswas, 2002), and sometimes as a source of
‘illegal migrants’ with their peripheral economies (Agathangelou, 2004: 106–110).
In both cases, the West is the referent of security. An interesting dimension this
analysis reveals is that while the gendered non-West is represented as a threat to the
West, the latter sometimes intentionally feminizes and hypermasculinizes the
former to pursue its security interests. It will be shown how the non-West in the form
of the southern neighbourhood of the EU is spatially constructed and
instrumentalized as an agent of western security through gendered representations.
The exploration of the mutually constitutive relationship between the construction
of gendered identities and notions of security unpacks Euro-Mediterranean security
relations. Since the institutionalization of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the EU’s
A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:2
7 0
3 J
un
e 2
01
5 
masculine identity (European, liberal, proactive, father, but sometimes aggressive)
vis-a`-vis that of North Africa (non-European, authoritarian, reactive, son) has been
built upon reflecting two different security notions: (1) the security notion which
relies on the promotion of democratic pluralism and human rights in its immediate
neighbourhood and (2) the security notion that has been operationalized as
‘externalization’. These notions are constitutive to the construction of a hybrid
hegemonic masculinity for the EU. On the one hand, this masculinity reflects the
bourgeois-rational model, which has been increasingly fed by the (neo)liberal vision
to spread particular political values and a market economy. On the other hand, in
relation to certain political issues, the citizen-warrior model dominates hegemonic
masculinity, which generates security practices underlined by militarization and
domination. This model involves hypermasculine characteristics, which means
exaggerated aggression, oppression, a greater tendency to inflict violence,
sometimes in tandem with a cold instrumental rationality. What is fundamental
for this analysis is that regarding certain political issues, the EU has reinforced
hypermasculine subordinate masculinity and externalized hypermasculinized
security practices in the southern neighbourhood by constructing various
‘threatening others’.
The gendered representations of the non-West in compatibility with the West’s
security notions are articulated through the process of constructing the self/other
dichotomy, which has two dimensions. The first one is about othering the non-West
as a threat to the security of the western self, as discussed previously. In the context
of Euro-Mediterranean security relations, the southern Mediterranean is
hypermasculized and feminized as the other of the EU and as a threat to the
security of the self. In certain areas such as democratization and human rights
promotion, the EU’s bourgeois-rational masculinity aims to guide ‘the other’
through adopting political and financial instruments developed by the EU so they
can follow the EU member states’ political and economic structures. In other words,
it is expected that the southern neighbourhood should emulate the EU, although this
does not lead to an abolition of the self/other dichotomy.1 The second dimension is
the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean. Hypermasculinity is
conceptualized in postcolonial feminist literature primarily by Nandy (1983) in the
case of India, where both the colonizer and the colonized value excessive
aggressiveness against each other. Ling uses the concept to explain the way Asian
economies react to recast ‘economic development into a retrieval of cultural-
national manhood’ against western capitalist hypermasculinity (Ling, 2002: 118; see
also Ling, 2000). However, in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations and issues
such as migration and counterterrorism cooperation, the hypermasculinity of the
non-western other is not simply a reaction and a threat to the West for distorting the
feminized non-West. It becomes a quality that the EU can utilize.
The second dimension of the self/other dichotomy is the construction of
‘threatening others’ that are targeted by hypermasculine practices in the southern
Mediterranean. Postcolonial literature reveals that the gendered self/other
construction is strongly detectable in non-western contexts, especially when the
non-western state begins to emulate the western model of modern, liberal, and
6 A. Bilgic
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developed state (Agathangelou, 2004: 106). It is shown that one of the most
important dimensions of ‘postcolonial insecurities’ is the generation of insecurity
towards the constructed ‘others’ (Das, 2003). While in some cases the ‘other’ is
ethno-religious minorities and dissidents, it can sometimes be another state
(Muppidi, 1999) or the whole ‘West’ itself (Niva, 1999). ‘The other’ in different
contexts is feminized as weak and emotional, but generally hypermasculinized as a
violent threat to the self. In this way, violent responses are justified while the agent
of security, which is either a postcolonial state or a leader of a non-state entity, is
reproduced as the sole representative of the non-western self (Agathangelou & Ling,
2009: 17–21).
Agathangelou (2004) shows that Euro-Mediterranean relations are gendered with
specific reference to the economy of sex and domestic labour which produces
racialized, sexualized and commodified women and men as sex workers, prostitutes,
housemaids and traffickers. The desire of ‘white but not quite’ locals in Cyprus,
Turkey and Greece to African and ‘white but not quite’ eastern European women
feeds into a economy of sex and domestic labour which positions these individuals
hierarchically. While those most oppressed are sexualized, racialized and
commodified sex workers and domestic employees as ‘the others’, in the case of
Euro-Mediterranean relations, ‘the others’ are individuals and societies that disrupt
the EU’s spatial construction of the southern Mediterranean as a non-threatening
space for EU security. In the case of irregular migration (including human
trafficking), individuals are racialized as non-white sub-Saharan migrants,
commodified as goods to be smuggled, and sexualized in the case of the sex trade
in white women (Agathangelou, 2004). Through externalization, hypermasculine
practices of North African states are encouraged to stop these racialized,
commodified and sexualized ‘others’ before they enter EU borders. Individuals
and societies in the southern Mediterranean space, on the other hand, are
hyperfeminized. This means that individuals and societies are rendered submissive
to the state’s policies with the purpose of constructing a society that is compatible
with the interests of non-western states (Ling, 2002). Before the Arab Spring, the
hyperfeminization of certain individuals and societies was profoundly expressed by
rendering them targets and/or tools of realizing the EU’s security objectives in
cooperation with North African authoritarian regimes. These hyperfeminized groups
disrupted the process in 2011.
To reiterate, the theoretical foundation of this analysis is mainly derived from a
postcolonial feminist approach that focuses on global West/non-West relations.
However, Euro-Mediterranean relations reveal particular dynamics that have been
neglected in this literature. First, the EU’s hegemonic masculinity has a hybrid
character, which also reproduces a hybrid subordinated masculinity for the southern
Mediterranean. Agathangelou (2004) strongly shows hypermasculinized political
and economic processes in the Euro-Mediterranean area which result in
racialization, commodification and hyperfeminization of individuals in the specific
case of sex trafficking. The current analysis brings the issue of counterterrorism into
the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean while highlighting the
feminization of the same region in relation to democracy and human rights
A Gender Analysis of Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations 7
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promotion. The focus on only one side of the gendered spatial construction of the
southern Mediterranean is analytically incomplete. Secondly, in the case of Euro-
Mediterranean relations, the EU’s hybrid hegemonic masculinity not only involves
hypermasculine characteristics but also reinforces hypermasculinity in order to
promote the security interests of the EU. Therefore, hypermasculine ideologies and
practices are not simply a strategy of the non-West against the West (for example,
Bin Laden’s hypermasculinity, Agathangelou & Ling, 2009: 16–17). They can also
be assets that are reinforced by the West. Hypermasculine practices can be
instrumentalized to keep the West secure as a result of processes such as
externalization, which will be discussed below. Finally, a postcolonial feminist
approach studies security mainly in relation to the self/other dichotomization.
However, this dichotomy takes a different form when the West governs its security
through subcontracting the non-West. Externalization is a novel process where
‘seemingly subaltern actors can and do appropriate, and even “refine”, “Western”
security ideas, practices, institutions, and discourses for their own interest’ (Ho¨nke
& Mu¨ller, 2012: 388). As a result, power relations are reproduced to prioritize the
EU’s and its collaborators’ security interests: a construction of the southern
Mediterranean as a non-threatening space for the EU while rendering hypermascu-
line North African states as the agents of European security (see Table 1).
Constructing Hybrid Euro-Mediterranean Space
As part of the construction of a hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was a milestone in 1995. The EMP’s three-basket
structure (political–security, economy, social and cultural) was formulated to
promote the EU’s security interests through facilitating political dialogue,
democracy and human rights promotion, building a liberal economy that would
contribute to the creation of political stability (Bilgin et al., 2011: 12) and to the
construction of a common identity in a Euro-Mediterranean space. With the EMP,
the EU aimed to show southern Mediterranean states and societies how to resolve
conflicts (through Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and Partnership Building
Measures (PBM)), how to prosper (through replicating a European model of free
trade) and how to conduct domestic politics in the (neo)liberal world as a persuasive
liberal ‘father’. Having an enlightened self-interest, it also financed the partnership
through instruments like Mesures D’Accompagnement (MEDA). As a result, a
hierarchical relationship between the EU and the southern Mediterranean emerged.
This hierarchical relationship has been problematized within the literature as
paternalistic – as Holm put it, ‘like a asymmetry between the teacher and the pupil’
(quoted in Bilgin, 2009: 14).
A gender reading of the Barcelona Process reveals that the EMP articulates the
EU’s hegemonic masculine identity, including, but also going beyond, paternalism.
This hegemonic masculine identity has predominantly been framed based on the
bourgeois-rational model of masculinity. In this political framework, the EU’s
masculine identity is constructed as a political actor who values dialogue over
aggression and violence in conflict resolution, promotes capitalist development
8 A. Bilgic
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through free trade, and empowers civil society against the authoritarian practices of
southern regimes. Like a father, it is willing to show its son how things should be
done in the neoliberal world order. As a result, a power hierarchy is tailored between
the EU – whose identity is masculinized in accordance with the bourgeois-rational
model (European, liberal, proactive, father) – and the southern Mediterranean –
feminized vis-a`-vis the former as being non-European, authoritarian, reactive, son.
This gendered relationship was constructed to serve the security interests of the
‘father’ by creating a liberal-capitalist, and therefore stable, geographical space in
which ‘he’ can ostensibly be secured.
The bourgeois-rational masculinity of the EU has been (re)constructed through
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Motivated by a goal to create a
‘ring of friends’ surrounding the EU (Solana, 2003), the ENP was formulated to
answer the question: ‘how best can we support our neighbours’ political and
economic transitions, and so tackle our citizens’ concerns?’ (quoted in Bilgin et al.,
2011: 14). Action plans were formulated to pursue a more passionate
democratization agenda while the EU Commission was given a mandate to monitor
how southern regimes implement the action plans. It can be argued that the EU’s
bourgeois-rational masculinity has found a new institutional manifestation with the
ENP. However, in addition to this, another type of policy, which has constructed a
hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space, was also adopted. Illiberal practices, as a result,
were institutionalized in liberal Euro-Mediterranean space.
The ENP reflects the insecurity atmosphere in the EU, which ‘acquired new
urgency’ after several terrorist attacks since 9/11 (EU Council, 2004: 3). As a
response to this security concern, the EU has formulated a new security policy,
identified in the literature as ‘externalization’ (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009;
Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009). Externalization can be defined as ‘the mode of
governance through which the EU seeks to ensure the European Neighbourhood
Policy’s countries’ participation in the realisation of its internal security project’
(Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009: 83). The EU’s major internal security project is the
construction of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for EU citizens.
Externalization deals with security concerns of the West in the non-West with the
cooperation of southern neighbours, in order to prevent them from becoming
internal security problems for the EU.
The process of externalization points to an alternative notion of security which
underlines the citizen-warrior model of masculinity. According to this model, the
citizen-warrior’s main responsibility lies solely with his own community, and with
protecting and promoting its interests even if this means inflicting harm on others.
In this sense, instrumental rationality is powerfully in effect. It is possible to observe
instrumental rationality underlying the ethnocentric security notion of the EU in
irregular migration prevention policies. For example, it has been argued that the
militarization of the Mediterranean actually contributed to directing migrants to
more dangerous routes (Lutterbeck, 2006; Spijkerboer, 2007). The EU has been
criticized by both scholars (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011) and international human
rights organizations (Statewatch, 2012) for violating the right to asylum. In addition,
the actor with the citizen-warrior model of masculinity does not hesitate to increase
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its control and domination of others (in this case, potential partners) by using a
‘stick’. For example, in the Seville Presidency Conclusions (Council of the
European Union, 2004) it was strongly emphasized that ‘insufficient cooperation’ of
a neighbouring country with the EU in the area of irregular migration prevention
would hinder ‘closer relations’ (para. 35). Other manifestations of such an approach
include the increasing association of receiving developmental aid with capacity-
building (Adepoju et. al, 2010) and rendering visa facilitation for citizens of North
African states conditional upon signing readmission agreements with the EU.
Although the literature has been critical to the EU’s policies in the southern
Mediterranean (Boswell, 2011; Messari & Klaauw, 2010), what has been
overlooked is that these security practices are constitutive to the EU’s identity
reflecting the citizen-warrior model.
In particular, patterns of cooperation in the areas of irregular migration prevention
and counterterrorism come forward in the literature because of certain security
practices of some European states, which appear to contradict the EU’s vision to
construct a democratic North Africa where human rights are promoted effectively.
In relation to the former, the EU has aimed to construct North Africa as a buffer zone
where asylum applications can be processed, irregular migrants can be contained
and irregular migrants in the EU can be repatriated (Betts & Milner, 2006; Bilgic,
2013: 113–124; De Haas, 2007). While some EU states funded the construction of
migrant camps in North Africa (EU Commission, 2004), the Mediterranean Sea has
been militarized to detect smuggling boats (Lutterbeck, 2004), even though
violating international law (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011). An implication of
hypermasculine security practices to control migration is the othering of sub-
Saharan migrants in particular. Gendered representations of migrants as threats to
national security and societal identities as hypermasculinized and feminized ‘others’
in the Mediterranean area have been documented (Kambouri & Zavos, 2011). In the
southern Mediterranean, sub-Saharan migrants are often represented at state and
societal level as a source of crime and violence (hypermasculinization) and of
prostitution, sickness and immorality (feminization) (Bensaad, 2007). As a result,
the hypermasculine security practices that the EU has reinforced, such as migration
camps, are justified. The use of migrant camps in North Africa, despite reports about
severe human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2004; Fortress Europe,
2007; Human Rights Watch, 2006, 2011b) and attempts to convert North African
countries into a buffer zone despite the well-documented insecurities of migrants in
these countries (see Bensaad, 2007; FIDH, 2011) point to how the hypermascu-
linized southern Mediterranean is used by the EU.
In addition, counterterrorism cooperation has been perceived in southern
Mediterranean societies as the most advanced between the EU and southern regimes
(Wolff, 2009), although the practice suggests otherwise. As Kaunert and Leonard
(2011: 302) show, the rhetoric of cooperation in this area is more powerful than in
operational cooperation. However, through this rhetoric precisely, southern
Mediterranean states are hypermasculinized and societies hyperfeminized. The
EU’s rhetoric on counterterrorism cooperation with the southern Mediterranean
regimes holding questionable democratic credentials has repeatedly appeared in
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Euro-Mediterranean documents. This rhetoric on the EU’s willingness to cooperate
has provided, as Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis (2007) highlight, ‘a new lease of life’ to
the pre-Arab Spring authoritarian regimes (quoted in Bilgin et al., 2011: 30).
Throughout the 2000s, problematic counterterrorism policies (such as illegality of
forming a crowd in Algeria, searching domiciles without a warrant in Morocco)
were introduced (Bilgin et al., 2011: 18–19). For this reason, Kausch and Youngs
(2009) strongly criticize the ENP for moving away from a security vision based on
democratization and human rights to a vision about control and surveillance, due to
EU member states’ reservations towards Islamist civil society. Hence, in some
sectors of the southern Mediterranean, the idea has emerged that North Africa is
doing the ‘dirty work’ of the EU (Bilgin & Bilgic, 2011: 7). With these policies,
hypermasculinized southern Mediterranean states obtained a stronger grip on
hyperfeminized societies. As a result, ‘the individual [wa]s manifestly less protected
on both sides of the Mediterranean’ (Galli, 2008).
These dualities have served to continue the gendered power hierarchy since 1995
in an institutionalized way. The illiberal security practices are constitutive to
hypermasculinized southern Mediterranean states within the liberal, feminized
southern Mediterranean space. The Arab Spring, however, has created a disruption
of these hybrid gendered identities, as some partners of the EU were toppled. The
last section of the article will examine the EU’s reaction to the transformations in
some southern Mediterranean countries, and its consequences for the EU’s hybrid
hegemonic masculinities.
Post-Arab Spring Euro-Mediterranean Security Relations
What happened following the self-immolation of Muhammed Bouazizi in Tunisia
and the brutal murder of Khalid Said, blogger and activist, in Egypt can be
considered, in Arendt’s words (1978: 7), as an ‘event’ that interrupted ‘routine
processes and routine procedures’ in many North African countries. The event, in its
best-known Euro-centric name, was the Arab Spring, which was the uprising of
individuals who tackled their powerlessness (ajz) in order to obtain dignity (al-
karama) (Hassan, 2012: 234). Given the current situation, it is too early to pass
judgement about the consequences of the uprisings for the region. Yet it is possible
to argue that ‘life-shattering experiences’ such as oppression and poverty led people
who were previously considered as ‘traditional’ in the western imagination ‘to
organize, against and also intervene in the repressive mechanisms that limit their
lives’ (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2013: 2–3). The Euro-Mediterranean space has been
constructed at the expense of individuals’ and social groups’ security, which
concerns the removal of repressive mechanisms that limit human freedoms. In other
words, this hybrid space has been one of those repressive mechanisms within global
West/non-West relations.
It has so far been argued that the EU has constructed a hybrid gendered identity
regarding its southern neighbourhood. This hybrid identity has reverberated onto the
southern neighbourhood by constructing a Euro-Mediterranean space where both
liberal and illiberal practices can be performed in order to promote the EU’s security
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interests. Feminization and hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean in
relation to different security issues are instrumental to constructing this space.
However, the EU’s southern partners were generally unpopular regimes, some of
which were eventually toppled during the Arab Spring. Given the criticisms that the
EU previously received in relation to cooperation with the former unpopular regimes
(see above), the EU seems to perceive the novelties in the region and has tried to
reformulate its policies (EU Commission, 2011a, 2011b, 2013). However, the
question appears: to what extent can the new policies of the EU and the new
perspective underlining them create a difference in the gendered power hierarchy in
Euro-Mediterranean security relations? The difference can be traced in two areas.
First, will feminization of southern Mediterranean states and societies in relation to
democracy and human rights promotion continue? Or will the EU, abandoning its
liberal ‘father’ who teaches his son how to do things in a neoliberal world, accept the
agency of southern Mediterranean societies not as ‘a footnote to the West’s history
nor [as] an appendix to neoliberal capitalist projects’ but as direct contributors to
‘global just politics’ (Agathangelou & Soguk, 2013: 2)? Second, will
hypermasculinization of the southern neighbourhood continue through the policies
of externalization, which hyperfeminize certain individuals, particularly irregular
migrants? In other words, the question is whether the security of individuals and
societies in the Euro-Mediterranean space will be taken into consideration in the
post-Arab Spring era or whether the Euro-Mediterranean space will again be
constructed to justify western intervention for the promotion of EU security
interests.
In spite of the new rhetoric adopted in the EU documents about democracy
promotion and more substantial civil society participation, along with new financial
documents with increased budgets for capacity-building for democratization (for
example, SPRING – Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth – with
e540 million in the southern Mediterranean, see EU Commission, 2013: 10), the
new perspective seems to re-bottle the old wine. As such, it aims to maintain the
hybrid gendered power hierarchy in Euro-Mediterranean security relations. Among
the wide range of policies, two are selected for discussion due to the bourgeois-
rational and citizen-warrior models of masculinity crystallized in them: the
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean
(PDSP) and migration control.
One of the most important policy practices, which can potentially challenge the
gendered power hierarchy in Euro-Mediterranean security relations, is promotion of
individual and societal securities through empowerment. In this way, local security
concerns such as lack of political rights and freedoms, poverty, unemployment and
domestic violence are prioritized. PDSP was launched by the EU Commission in
2011 in order to support democratic transitions in the southern neighbourhood.
In fact, PDSP involves a potential for constructing a different Euro-Mediterranean
space. For example, the document explicitly shows that the political transformation
of North Africa ‘will be developed by listening not only to requests for support from
partner governments, but also to demands expressed by civil society’ (EU
Commission, 2011a: 3). While southern Mediterranean states are encouraged to
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reform in order to achieve ‘advanced status’ in their relations with the EU, civil
society actors are considered the source of ‘much-needed support for the reforms
and involvement in areas close to citizens’ concerns such as human rights, the
environment, social and economic development’ (EU Commission, 2011a: 6).
However, a detailed analysis of the programme reveals that the EU has
maintained (and reconstructed) the bourgeois-rational hegemonic masculinity
towards the southern Mediterranean. First, the EMP, similarly to previous attempts,
prioritizes the bourgeois-rational approach of having a free market for
democratization while merely acknowledging the importance of social justice;
second, the programme is black-boxing civil society without touching the
important well-known problems such as quasi-governmental NGOs or govern-
mental control over financial aid from the EU to civil society in the southern
Mediterranean; third, crucial civil society actors during the Arab Spring, trade
unions and other labour organizations, are not given the necessary importance in
the programme (Teti, 2012: 273–275). Hence, the ‘new’ partnership maintains ‘the
distinction between political and socio-economic rights characteristic of
“minimalist” (neo)liberal definitions of democracy’ (Teti, 2012: 276). It is indeed
the fact that the EU has not paid attention to, for example, Islamist civil society
organizations which resisted alongside the secular movements during the Arab
Spring (Mamdani, 2013: 13). Real individual security issues such as domestic
violence were also overlooked, while gender equality is limited to lip-service
regarding equal participation of women in ‘political and economic life’ (EU
Commission, 2011b). The Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility is already a
questionable formation while its predecessor, the Euro-Mediterranean Civil
Society Forum (founded in 1995), was eventually disempowered and the
Commission itself stopped sending a representative. In other words, the EU seems
to continue to feminize southern Mediterranean states and civil societies by
expecting them to follow the EU’s democratization agenda without giving due
attention to the realities of southern Mediterranean countries.
The second dimension of the EU’s ‘new’ approach in the post-Arab Spring era
towards the southern Mediterranean is the issue of migration control. It must be
noted that the EU has adopted a more comprehensive and practical mobility scheme
between EU and southern Mediterranean states. However, as in the previous
attempts, this mobility scheme is made conditional upon partner states’ willingness
to cooperate with the EU in the area of irregular migration prevention (EU
Commission, 2011b: 11). In other words, the mobility partnerships seem to be a ‘re-
branding of existing visa facilitation policies’ (Echagu¨e et al., 2011: 331). In terms
of capacity-building in the fight against ‘illegal’ migration following the fall of
authoritarian regimes, EU member states have been quick to sign new bilateral
agreements (for example the Italy–Tunisia agreement of 2011 promising aid in
return for Tunisia’s cooperation in stopping further departures), while the EU has
also followed member states’ practices.
In a visit to Tunis by Commission President Barroso in April 2011, it was
made clear that the EU’s offer of around e400 million of aid to support
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Tunisia’s democratic transition would necessitate reciprocal actions to counter
irregular migration. (Carrera et al., 2012: 5–6; for member state ‘fears’ of
migrant influx from the southern Mediterranean, see Dennison, 2013: 125)
In addition, the EU has so far shown no inclination to revise the much-disputed
The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX)
operations in the Mediterranean (for criticisms of FRONTEX operations between
2011 and 2013, see Human Rights Watch, 2011a; Statewatch, 2012; Sunderland,
2013). None of the documents the EU produced after 2011 on southern
Mediterranean relations offered a specific policy to address the security problems
that irregular migrants face in North Africa (FIDH, 2011). Irregular migration
only appears as a problem to be tackled through control and domination.
Hypermasculinized externalization is likely to continue.
Given the aforementioned continuities in the EU’s approach to the southern
Mediterranean in the post-Arab Spring era, it can be argued that the EU aims to
reconstruct the hybrid Euro-Mediterranean space by subordinating the southern
Mediterranean through feminizing and hypermasculinizing it. In the area of
democracy promotion, the EU adopts the bourgeois-rational masculine identity by
acting like a capitalist, developed, paternal figure towards ‘infant’ southern
Mediterranean countries, especially towards southern Mediterranean civil society.
The EU’s security is still regarded as conditional upon a democratic southern
Mediterranean, which can be built on the EU’s terms. On the other hand, when it
comes to the issue of migration control, the EU’s citizen-warrior masculine identity
dominates, and the EU continues its externalization practices, which result in a
hypermasculinized subordinated southern Mediterranean.
Conclusion
In this article, I argued that Euro-Mediterranean security relations embody a
gendered power hierarchy between the hybrid hegemonic masculinity of the
(bourgeois-rational and citizen-warrior) EU and the subordinate (both feminized
and hypermasculinized) southern neighbourhood. In addition, since the Arab
Spring, the EU has been determined to maintain the status quo by preserving these
gendered power relations. This is because feminizing and hypermasculinizing the
southern neighbourhood is instrumental to constructing a secure geographical
space for the EU. This gender analysis differs from the literature on Euro-
Mediterranean relations because of its specific focus on the (re)construction
processes of gendered identities in tandem with the EU’s competing notions of
security. Therefore, it can be called a feminist intervention on the issue. Departing
from the idea that the notions of security and political identity construction
processes are inseparable, it was highlighted that examination of the gendered
dimension of identity construction processes can provide a more insightful
perspective to reveal how power operates in the Euro-Mediterranean security–
identity nexus. In addition, this gendered perspective can enable an analysis of
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feminist ideas and practices challenging the hierarchical identities in Euro-
Mediterranean security relations.
The EU’s hegemonic masculinity is a fluid and dynamic identity, which can be
transformed in accordance with changing political and social conditions. The
increasing inclusion of the characteristics of the citizen-warrior model in the
hegemonic masculine identity of the EU in the post-9/11 era points to this
adaptability and dynamism of masculinities. Second, masculinities (hegemonic or
not) are not monolithic, but inclusive to different, even clashing, elements. The most
explicit expression of this argument is the duality of the EU’s hegemonic
masculinity. On the one hand, reflecting the bourgeois-rational model, it acts like an
enlightened father who is willing to teach his son the conditions of peaceful co-
existence in the liberal world by upholding democracy, human rights and freedoms,
and the values of a free market economy. On the other hand, the citizen-warrior EU
prioritizes its own domestic security and takes ‘necessary’ measures even if these
measures have the potential to harm others. An important contribution of gendered
analysis is to show that these two competing masculinities generating the EU’s
hegemonic masculinity co-exist because they jointly serve the EU’s competing
security notions. The hegemonic masculinity of the EU dominating the EMP period
was effeminizing southern Mediterranean masculinities as politically, economically
and socially underdeveloped, and therefore in need of guidance and support from a
superior authority. In this way, the EU has been able to reconfigure relations where
power lies with itself as opposed to the non-European, authoritarian, economically
and socially weak southern Mediterranean. However, with the ENP, and especially
the policy of externalization, conflicting with its earlier position, the EU has
reinforced the hypermasculinization of the southern Mediterranean.
Note
1. This is different from ‘mimicry’, which is a survival strategy of the colonized by emulating the
colonizer (see Bhabha, 2004; Ling, 2002: 116–117). In this analysis, emulation is encouraged by the
EU to create a non-threatening non-western space.
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